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Case Comments
Standard of Review For Regulations of Commercial
Speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the city of San Diego enacted an ordinance banning
outdoor advertising display signs.' This general prohibition ex-
empted on-site signs2 and twelve other specific categories of ad-
vertisements.3 The ordinance did not distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial messages. 4 After the Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld the ordinance5 against a first
amendment6 challenge, two outdoor advertising companies ar-
gued to the United States Supreme Court that the ordinance vi-
olated the first amendment because it impermissibly restricted
billboard messages on the basis of their content.7 The appel-
1. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795 (New Series) (Mar. 14, 1972), re-
printed in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2885 (1981).
The term "advertising display sign" refers to any permanent, rigid sign such as
a billboard, but not to a picket sign or lawn sign. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2, 610 P.2d 407, 410 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 513 n.2
(1980).
2. On-site signs identify the name of the premises where the sign is lo-
cated or the name of the owner or occupant, or advertise goods manufactured
on, or services rendered on, the premises. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795
(New Series) (Mar. 14, 1972) § 101.0700(B).
3. These twelve categories included government signs, bench signs at bus
stops, historical plaques, religious symbols, signs not visible from off the prop-
erty, time-temperature-news signs, for-sale signs, and temporary political cam-
paign signs. Id. § 101.0700(F).
4. See id. § 101.700(B). Courts use an intermediate standard of review for
content-based regulations of commercial speech, in contrast to the strict "com-
pelling state interest" test applied to content-based restrictions of noncommer-
cial speech. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
5. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 885-86, 610 P.2d
407, 429, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 532 (1980). The California Supreme Court relied pri-
marily on summary affirmances by the United States Supreme Court of state
court decisions sustaining billboard regulations. See id. at 866-67, 610 P.2d at
417, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (citing Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 92 (1979); New-
man Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978)). Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882
(1981), is the first plenary consideration by the Court of a first amendment
challenge to a billboard regulation. Id. at 2887-88.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. L
7. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance's on-site exception and several
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lants also argued that even the application of the ordinance to
purely commercial speech would be invalid because it reached
farther than was necessary to achieve its stated aims of traffic
safety and aesthetics.8 In a plurality opinion, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a ban on noncommercial
billboards that contains exceptions defined by the subject mat-
ter of the exempted signs violates the first amendment, but that
a prohibition of off-site commercial billboards which is in-
tended to promote traffic safety and aesthetics is permissible.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
This holding reflects the Court's bifurcated method of re-
viewing the San Diego ordinance; stricter scrutiny was applied
to the law's noncommercial application than to its commercial
component. This bifurcated analysis resulted from the Court's
relaxation of its previously established standard for review of
commercial speech regulations. 9 The Metromedia opinion does
not, however, justify this more lenient review or delineate the
scope of its application.' 0 If this deferential standard and the
resulting bifurcated analysis are not limited to the facts of Me-
tromedia, courts reviewing regulations that apply to both com-
mercial and noncommercial speech will have to distinguish
between them." Unless this line is clearly drawn, however, the
bifurcated analysis will encourage evasion of commercial
speech regulations12 and will also infringe on some fully pro-
tected expression.13 The Court's commercial speech decisions
do not, however, offer a consistent definition of commercial
speech.' 4
This Comment will review the development of the commer-
of its categorical exceptions, see supra notes 2-3, distinguished between bill-
boards according to the message conveyed, and therefore prevented the ordi-
nance from being content-neutral. Brief of Appellants at 32, Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the prohibition violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 101 S. Ct. at 2887. Although the plu-
rality never reached the due process issue with respect to the ordinance as a
whole, they implicitly held that the ordinance, as applied to commercial bill-
boards, withstood the due process challenge as well as the first amendment ob-
jection. See id. at 2887.
8. Brief of Appellants at 28-29, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101
S. Ct. 2882 (1981). For a discussion of the standard of review for regulations of
commercial speech, see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 33-35, 38-48, 55-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 47, 57-73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 81-82, 85-89, 95-96 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 80, 91-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 84.
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cial speech doctrine and describe Metromedia's departure from
the established standard of scrutiny for commercial speech reg-
ulations. The resulting bifurcated analysis of billboard regula-
tions will also be examined. Arguing that the commercial
component of the San Diego ordinance warranted a deferential
review, the Comment offers a justification for this deferential
standard and concludes that this level of scrutiny applies to a
broad subcategory of commercial speech regulations. After
noting the definitional problems created by the bifurcated ap-
proach, the Comment suggests that none of the definitions pro-
posed by the Court, nor any reasonable modification of them,
can solve these problems. The Comment therefore proposes
modifying the present commercial speech doctrine underlying
the standards of review that leads to the bifurcated approach.
The Court should recognize that commercial speech can be reg-
ulated more strictly than noncommercial speech only when the
regulation relates to the contractual function of commercial ad-
vertising. This theory provides a satisfactory definition of com-
mercial speech and is consistent with all of the Court's
commercial speech decisions except Metromedia itself.
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY v. VIRGINIA CITIZENS
CONSUMER COUNCIL, INC.
Application of first amendment limitations to the regulation
of commercial advertisements is a recent development. 5 The
Supreme Court originally considered a first amendment chal-
lenge to a commercial advertising regulation in 1942, upholding
an ordinance prohibiting commercial handbilling.16 The opin-
ion suggested that commercial speech was not protected by the
first amendment.' 7
15. Other forms of speech that are arguably "commercial" have long re-
ceived full first amendment protection. For example, speech does not lose its
protected status because it is based in part on the economic motivation of the
speaker, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (sale of literature by
Jehovah's Witnesses), because it takes the form of a paid advertisement, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (paid political advertise-
ment in newspaper), or because it is sold for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959) (books).
16. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
17. The Valentine Court held that first amendment restraints upon regula-
tions of the time, place, or manner of speech in public forums do not apply to
commercial advertising. Id. at 54. Some lower courts and commentators, how-
ever, have cited Valentine for the broader proposition that commercial speech
1982]
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In 1976, the Court rejected this characterization of the first
amendment's scope, holding in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 18 that purely
commercial advertising was entitled to first amendment protec-
tion because of its informational value to the consumer and the
general public.19 The Court noted, however, that its holding
was not intended to foreclose all regulations of commercial
speech2 0 and indicated that laws prohibiting false or misleading
advertising were permissible.2 1 Although regulation of decep-
tive advertising appears to violate first amendment principles, 22
the Court maintained that such regulation is, generally, consti-
is wholly unprotected under the first amendment, E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS77-
TITiONAL LAw §§ 12-15, at 653 n.16 (1978); Barrett, "The Uncharted Area"--Com-
mercial Speech and the First Amendmen4 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 175, 176 (1980).
Contra Schiro, Commercial Speech. The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 SuP. CT.
REV. 45, 47-48. See generally DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid
Access to the Press, 26 HAsTiNGS L.J. 745 (1975).
18. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
19. Id. at 761-70. The Court identified three justifications for such protec-
tion: consumers have a strong interest in receiving information about products;
the free flow of commercial price and product information promotes intelligent
consumer decisions and thus contributes to a proper allocation of resources;
and such information allows the formation of intelligent opinions concerning
regulation of the commercial system. Id. at 763-65.
20. Id. at 770.
21. Id. at 771-72. See also Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978).
22. Since the value of commercial speech lies in the information conveyed,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text, false and misleading advertisements
are not protected by the first amendment. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). Nevertheless, established first
amendment principles present several obstacles to laws designed to protect
consumers from deceptive advertising. For example, prohibitions on such ad-
vertisements may run afoul of the "chilling effect" doctrine. A law produces a
chilling effect when speakers are deterred from engaging in constitutionally
protected expression because they fear that their speech will be held unpro-
tected and lead to liability. L TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-12, at 634 (1978). Like
false and misleading commercial speech, false noncommercial speech is not
protected for its own sake. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
Yet the chilling effect doctrine prohibits defamation laws from imposing liabil-
ity without fault. Id. at 347. Prohibitions on false advertising, however, usually
impose strict liability on disseminators of false commercial information. E.g.,
Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979);
Federal Trade Commission Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1980).
Full disclosure laws and prior restraints are two other primary methods of
protecting consumers from deceptive advertising. See Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, 393-95 (1979). Both
devices are strictly limited by traditional first amendment doctrine. Laws re-
quiring a newspaper, for example, to print a particular noncommercial message
are generally invalid under the first amendment, Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), as are laws imposing prior restraints on speech,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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tutional.23 Beginning with Virginia Pharmacy, the commercial
speech doctrine developed into a separate set of first amend-
ment principles. These principles reflect the Court's attempts
to permit legislative control of deceptive advertising without
weakening first amendment protection for noncommercial
forms of expression.24
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court attempted to reconcile
regulation of advertising with established first amendment
rules by emphasizing, in dictum, that stricter control of com-
mercial speech is permissible because of the greater ver-
ifiability of such expression and the profit motive supporting
it.25 The Court stated that these differences between commer-
cial speech and other protected expression explain why the
first amendment does not prohibit the regulatory devices most
commonly used to protect consumers from deceptive- advertis-
ing.26 This analysis suggests that regulations of truthful com-
mercial speech that do not rely on these devices should be
reviewed according to traditional first amendment principles; 27
content-based regulations should be strictly scrutinized,28 and
content-neutral regulations should be subjected to a more leni-
ent balancing test.29 The standard of review the Court applied
23. 425 U.S. at 770-72 & n.24. See id. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
25. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (dictum).
26. Id. The Court indicated that direct prohibitions, full disclosure laws,
and prior restraints are permitted as applied to commercial advertising. Id.
Commercial speech's greater verifiability allegedly makes it more resistant to a
chilling effect from direct prohibition, and the profit motive supporting commer-
cial speech supposedly lessens the deterrent effect of the three restrictions. Id.
Contra Farber, supra note 22, at 385-86.
27. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 573, 575 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
28. The purpose of content-based regulations relates to the communicative
impact of the speech or expression. E.g., L TAME, supra note 17, at §§ 12-2, 12-
3; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975). But
see Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEo. L.J. 727, 743-46 (1980). There are essentially two types of content-based
regulations: those which explicitly restrict expression according to its content,
and those which, although facially content-neutral, are substantially motivated
by government hostility toward certain content. Stone, Restrictions of Speech
Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
Cm. L. REV. 81, 81 n.3 (1978); see L. TRInE, supra note 17, at §§ 12-2, 12-3, 12-5. A
content-based regulation is permitted only if the speech regulated falls within
one of a few unprotected categories or if the regulation is narrowly drawn to
serve a compelling state interest. L TAME, supra note 17, § 12-8, at 602.
29. 425 U.S. at 771. When evaluating content-neutral restrictions of non-
commercial speech, the Court has weighed the burden imposed on communica-
tion against the state interests served by the regulation. L TRBE, supra note
17, § 12-20, at 683; see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motive in Constitu-
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in Virginia Pharmacy, and later in Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingsboro,30 is consistent with this interpreta-
tion of the Virginia Pharmacy dictum.31 Although this analysis
also suggests that the Court would review regulations of decep-
tive advertising more leniently than analogous regulations of
noncommercial speech, the Court did not articulate this third
level of scrutiny.
B. CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. V. PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
The Court subsequently adopted a broader justification for
permitting stricter regulation of commercial speech. Such laws
can be reviewed more leniently because commercial advertis-
ing occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of first amend-
ment values. '32
The implications of this new rationale became evident in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1335-36 (1970). The government's burden in justi-
fying a content-neutral regulation increases when the impact of the restriction
falls on some groups or on some messages more than others, see, e.g., Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 186 (1943), or when the regulation restricts use of a
traditional public forum, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1938). Con-
versely, such a regulation is more likely to be upheld if alternative channels of
communications are available to the speaker or if there is no less restrictive al-
ternative to achieve the government end. Ely, supra, at 1336; see Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. at 147.
30. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
31. In both cases, the Court applied the customary strict standard of re-
view to content-based restrictions on commercial speech that were unrelated to
consumer protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575-77 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Cox, ForewarcL"
Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HAnv. L REv. 1, 34-36 (1980).
The possibility that the message will have an undesirable effect does not, by
itself, constitute a compelling interest or render the speech unprotected. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 17, at §§ 12-8-12-11. In Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark, the
state sought to prevent consumers from receiving commercial information be-
cause it believed they would act on that information in a manner not in their
self-interest. The Court rejected both prohibitions on advertising as "paternal-
istic." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. at 766-69; Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro, 431 U.S. at
94-96.
32. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). If commercial
speech is less valuable than other forms of expression, it follows that all regula-
tions of commercial advertising should be less strictly scrutinized than analo-
gous noncommercial regulations. See The Supreme Cour 1979 Term, 94 HAMv.
L. REv. 75, 168 n.58 (1980) (implying that rationale for lesser protection of com-
mercial speech in Ohralih explains departure from strict scrutiny of content-
based regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
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sion.33 The Central Hudson Court adopted a three-part test
subjecting all regulations of protected commercial speech 34 to
an intermediate level of scrutiny. Under this test, a commercial
speech regulation is valid only if it seeks to implement a sub-
stantial government interest, directly advances that interest,
and reaches no further than neces'sary to accomplish the given
objective.35 In Central Hudson, the challenged regulation pro-
hibited advertisements by utilities promoting use of electricity;
it therefore regulated nondeceptive speech and was facially
content-based.36 The intermediate standard of review is clearly
more permissive than the compelling state interest test applied
in the review of content-based regulations of noncommercial
speech.37 The Court left untouched, however, the established
rule of strict scrutiny for content-based regulations of noncom-
mercial speech. Thus, a court reviewing a content-based regu-
lation that applies to both commercial and noncommercial
speech must apparently divide the ordinance into separate
components and review each according to the appropriate
standard.
C. METROMEDIA, INC. V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO
Reflecting the two-level analysis of content-based regula-
tions suggested by Central Hudson, the plurality in Me-
tromedia38 reviewed the San Diego ordinance's application to
33. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 559.
37. Cox, supra note 31, at 34-36 (comparing rules applied in Linmark and
Central Hudson). The purpose of the regulation in Central Hudson was to pre-
vent the increased electricity consumption the promotional ads would likely in-
duce. 447 U.S. at 559. Although the ban would have been struck down as
'paternalistic" under the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark, see
supra note 28, the Central Hudson Court recognized the ban as a legitimate
way of promoting energy conservation. 447 U.S. at 568-69.
38. Four Justices joined the plurality opinion, and Justices Brennan and
Blackman concurred in the result. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S.-
Ct. 2882, 2900 (1981). The three dissenters filed separate opinions. Id. at 2909
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2917 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2924 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Although the plurality opinion struck down the San Di-
ego ordinance based on the invalidity of its noncommercial component, it held
that the commercial portion would be constitutional if the California Supreme
Court ruled that it was severable from the invalid noncommercial part. 101 S.
Ct. at 2899-900 n.26. By contrast, the Brennan-Blackmun concurrence applied a
unitary standard of review and held the ordinance as a whole invalid. See id. at
2902, 2907 (Brennan, J., concurring). Similarly, the three dissenters reviewed
the ordinance without separating its two components. All three, however, used
a deferential standard of review and upheld the law. See id. at 2915 (Stevens,
1982]
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commercial and noncommercial messages under different stan-
dards.3 9 The plurality reviewed the commercial component of
the ordinance under the three-part test for commercial speech
established in Central Hudson,40 a test embodying an interme-
diate level of scrutiny. Finding that the ordinance sought to im-
plement the substantial government interests of traffic safety
and aesthetics41 and that it reached no farther than necessary
to promote these interests,42 the Metromedia plurality summa-
rily concluded that the ordinance satisfied the first and third
criteria of the Central Hudson test.4 3 Finally, the plurality held
that the ordinance directly advanced the city's two interests be-
cause the presence of billboards impaired both traffic safety
and the city's appearance.44 In reaching this conclusion, the
plurality found that the city's judgment that these signs created
safety and aesthetic problems was "not manifestly unreasona-
ble."45 This language suggests a standard of review similar to
the "rational basis" test used in evaluating due process chal-
lenges to economic regulations.46 Thus, while claiming to apply
the intermediate scrutiny mandated by Central Hudson, the
J., dissenting); id. at 2920 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2924-25 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See also infra note 55.
39. 101 S. Ct. at 2891. The two-tiered approach is appropriate because both
parts of the ordinance are content-based. The commercial component exempts
on-site commercial billboards, and such signs are defined according to their
subject-matter. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In addition, the non-
commercial component also contains exceptions defined by subject matter.
The exemption for political campaign signs is an example. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text. Even restrictions of noncommercial speech that do not sin-
gle out a particular viewpoint but only a type of subject matter are considered
content-based and are subjected to strict scrutiny. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); see Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 99 (1972).
40. 101 S. Ct. at 2892. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
41. 101 S. Ct. at 2892-93 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978)) (aesthetics); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973)
(aesthetics); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (aesthetics); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (traffic safety).
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2893. Although the plurality readily accepted this conclu-
sion, it is possible that limiting the size and placement of billboards could
achieve the same ends with fewer restrictions. The plurality, however, was ap-
plying the Central Hudson test deferentially. See infra notes 46-48 and accom-
panying text. Thus, it may not have felt constrained to consider empirical
evidence on this issue in reaching its conclusion.
43. 101 S. Ct. at 2892.
44. Id. at 2893.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). When applying
the rational basis test, the Court defers to the legislative judgment if some ra-
tional justification for that judgment exists, even if the law in question is over
or underinclusive. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 487-88.
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plurality actually evaluated the commercial component of the
ordinance under a more lenient "deferential" test.47 This defer-
ential review is also evident in the plurality's assertion that the
city "could reasonably conclude" that off-site signs created a
more acute problem than on-site signs and that a greater need
for on-site signs justified their exemption from the ban.4 8
Notwithstanding the plurality's deferential treatment of the
ordinance's commercial aspect, they subjected its noncommer-
cial component to strict scrutiny,49 holding that portion invalid
because it was not narrowly drawn.S0 The ordinance exempted
political campaign signs, for example, without evidence that
they had a less adverse effect on traffic safety or aesthetics
than prohibited noncommercial signs. 1 In addition, the plural-
ity noted an alternative ground for invalidating the ordinance.
Although the San Diego ban contains an exception for on-site
commercial billboards, it prohibits all but a few noncommercial
signs in the same location, even though noncommercial signs
pose no greater threat to traffic safety and aesthetics.52 The or-
dinance thus values commercial messages concerning goods
and services connected with a particular site more than it val-
ues most noncommercial messages.5 3 Such an ordinance is in-
valid because it violates the doctrine that noncommercial
speech is more valuable, and therefore entitled to more protec-
tion, than commercial speech.5 4
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BIFURCATED APPROACH
A. TiE STANDARD OF REVIEW: INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY OR REASONABLENESS
The Court in Metromedia5 5 failed to explain its retreat from
47. See 101 S. Ct. at 2906 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. 101 S. Ct. at 2894-95. Under an intermediate standard, exceptions to a
regulation, unless actually justified, would undermine the conclusion that the
regulation directly advanced a state interest. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1981).
49. The exceptions to the noncommercial component are defined only in
terms of general subject matter, rather than in terms of the expression of any
particular viewpoint. Nevertheless, a regulation containing such exceptions is
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. See supra note 39.
50. See 101 S. Ct at 2896.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2895.
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Only the plurality divided the ordinance into commercial and noncom-
mercial components, each of which is then reviewed under a different standard.
See supra note 38. Nevertheless, a majority of the Court would review the com-
1982]
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Central Hudson's intermediate standard of review to a more
deferential standard of review for regulations of billboards with
commercial messages.5 6 It is unclear whether these different
standards can be reconciled, or whether Metromedia repre-
sents a general relaxation of the Central Hudson test. To an-
swer that question, this section will examine three alternative
justifications for the deferential review of the San Diego
ordinance.
1. Aesthetics
The subjective nature of San Diego's aesthetic interest in
the billboard ban may explain the different standards of review
in Metromedia and Central Hudson. Although traffic safety
was also a stated objective of the ordinance, the Metromedia
plurality may have believed that this interest was minimal and
was merely added to bolster the aesthetic purpose.57 If the plu-
rality believed that only the aesthetic interest was genuine,
mercial component deferentially, and a different majority would require that a
form of heightened scrutiny be applied to the noncommercial component. In
addition to the four-member plurality, the three dissenters adopted a deferen-
tial standard for review of commercial billboards. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2920
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). By contrast, a regulation of noncommercial signs
that contains subject-matter exceptions will have to withstand at least an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny to command the approval of a majority of the Court.
Although the three dissenters in Metromedia would treat even these regula-
tions deferentially, Justices Brennan and Blackmun apparently would not.
Their concurrence did not reach this issue, but it contains dicta that subject-
matter exceptions to a billboard ban will be reviewed under a standard at least
as strict as the intermediate level of scrutiny applied to the entire ban. 101 S.
Ct. at 2905 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, an ordinance will be approved
by five Justices only if it satisfies at least an intermediate-level test. Because
Justice Stewart was a member of the plurality, his replacement by Justice
O'Connor cannot displace either of these apparent majorities.
56. The strictest scrutiny that a majority of the Court would apply to the
noncommercial part of the ordinance is embodied in an intermediate-level re-
view virtually identical to the Central Hudson text. Justice Brennan's concur-
rence in Metromedia treated the noncommercial ban according to the test
adopted in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 101 S. Ct. at
2902 (Brennan, J., concurring). The test in Schad required that a regulation be
narrowly drawn and further a substantial government interest. 101 S. Ct. at
2184. These are essentially the elements of the test adopted in Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), for the re-
view of regulations of truthful commercial speech. Had the Central Hudson
test been used for commercial billboards, the ordinance would have been re-
viewed under a single standard.
57. This interpretation may be attributed to the plurality, because the rule
in California, before it was explicitly overruled in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 860-61, 610 P.2d 407, 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 513 (1980),
was that aesthetics alone was inadequate to justify an exercise of police power.
Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 320, 100 P. 867, 868 (1909). It is there-
fore likely that the actual motive for the San Diego ordinance was purely aes-
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their deferential evaluation may stem from a reluctance to im-
pose their judgment in an admittedly subjective area.5 8
Both courts and commentators, however, have proposed
methods of objectively reviewing aesthetic regulations. For ex-
ample, Justice Brennan suggested in his Metromedia concur-
rence that if a regulation is part of a comprehensive plan to
remedy aesthetic problems over a period of time, that regula-
tion will be valid even if it implements only a portion of the
overall plan.59 This approach distinguishes haphazard cleanup
efforts from aesthetic planning and thus allows courts to apply
more than minimal scrutiny while deferring to a city's concep-
tion of its aesthetic needs. Therefore, if the plurality departed
from the intermediate standard in Central Hudson to avoid
heightened scrutiny of the aesthetic value of the San Diego or-
dinance, that departure is unjustified.
2. Minimal Informational Value
The Metromedia plurality's failure to acknowledge the in-
terests of consumers and the public in receiving information
contained in commercial billboard advertisements 60 suggests
another explanation for its deferential treatment of the ordi-
nance's commercial component. Some commercial advertising
uses persuasive messages designed to create a favorable im-
pression of a product and consequently contains little informa-
tion.61 Because billboards must be visible from a distance,
their content is necessarily limited to visual imagery and short
verbal messages. This feature of billboard advertising suggests
thetic and that the traffic safety justification was added to bolster what the city
perceived as an inadequate basis for the law.
58. See 101 S. Ct. at 2925 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The belief that aes-
thetic justifications for land-use regulations are too subjective to be reviewed
has deterred some state courts from applying more than minimal scrutiny to
such laws. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New
General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv.
603, 645 (1981); Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of
Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MmN. L. REv. 1, 2-4, 5 n.16 (1977). The Court has
avoided the question of whether land-use regulations based on aesthetics can
be subjected to heightened scrutiny. E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
59. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2904-05 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring). See also Williams, supra note 58, at 6-20.
60. The plurality viewed the issue of the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance's commercial component as a "conflict between the city's land use inter-
ests and the commercial interests of those seeking to purvey goods and
services within the city." 101 S. Ct. at 2895.
61. See Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation
of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REV. 661, 663-69 (1977); Note, Fairness and Unfair-
ness in Television Product Advertising, 76 MiCH. I. REV. 498, 501-06 (1978).
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that the plurality may have reviewed the San Diego ordinance
deferentially because they believed that billboard advertise-
ments usually contain little of the informational value justify-
ing first amendment protection for commercial speech in other
media. 62 But a hierarchical approach to the review of commer-
cial speech regulations based on the informational content of
that speech presents obvious problems of consistency and ob-
jectivity.63 If the plurality based their deferential review on
this approach, the opinion is flawed because it fails to set out
appropriate criteria to classify advertisements according to the
degree of their informational content. 4
3. The Noncommercial Speech Analogy
The different levels of scrutiny employed in Central Hud-
son and Metromedia can be reconciled by analogizing to first
amendment treatment of restrictions on noncommercial
speech, which employs two levels of review-a strict standard
for content-based regulations and a more relaxed one for con-
tent-neutral regulations.65 Because commercial speech re-
quires less protection than noncommercial speech,66 the two
levels of review for regulations of commercial expression
should be more lenient than the standards applied in reviewing
analogous regulations of noncommercial speech. Content-
based regulations of commercial speech should therefore re-
ceive intermediate scrutiny, and content-neutral regulations
should be reviewed even more leniently, perhaps according to
the deferential rational basis test employed in Metromedia.67
62. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held that informational interests of
consumers and the public provided the only justification for protecting com-
mercial speech under the first amendment. 425 U.S. at 763-65. If the regulation
of commercial billboards implicates these first amendment values minimally or
not at all, then the conflict is between the city's land-use interests and the eco-
nomic interests of commercial advertisers. See supra note 60. The constitu-
tional issue then becomes the validity of an economic regulation under the due
process clause rather than the validity of a regulation of speech under the first
amendment. This interpretation of the plurality's reasoning explains the defer-
ential standard of review it employed, because such a deferential standard is
used in the adjudication of economic due process challenges. See supra note
46.
63. See Farber, supra note 22, at 383-84.
64. The promotional advertisements of utilities were reviewed according to
an intermediate standard in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The plurality does not explain, however, why
such advertisements are likely to contain more information than billboard
advertisements.
65. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 47.
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Using two levels of scrutiny to review regulations of com-
mercial speech is appropriate because the rationale for the two-
tier review of noncommercial speech regulations applies, at
least in part, to regulations of commercial advertising. Courts
scrutinize content-based regulations of noncommercial speech
more strictly than content-neutral regulations for two reasons.
First, content-based regulations generally create greater distor-
tion of "the marketplace of ideas" 6 8 and thereby impair more
seriously the first amendment ideal of an unhindered search
for social and political truth.69 The stricter scrutiny applied to
these regulations probably reflects the Court's determination
that a more compelling reason is required to justify greater dis-
tortion. Because the commercial speech doctrine is designed to
further intelligent consumer choices and public knowledge of
the commercial system, 70 a regulation that is more likely to dis-
tort the flow of commercial information also demands stricter
scrutiny. The second justification for stricter scrutiny of con-
tent-based regulations of non-commercial speech derives from
the need to identify impermissable government motives. Gov-
ernment disapproval of a non-commercial message is not a le-
gitimate ground for regulation, and content-based regulations
are more likely than content-neutral ones to be based on such
disapproval.71 The greater need to identify these motives in re-
viewing content-based regulations therefore provides the sec-
ond justification for stricter scrutiny of such laws.7 2 In contrast,
because government disapproval of a commercial message is a
permissible basis for restricting that message, content-based
regulations of commercial advertising need not be scrutinized
more strictly than content-neutral ones to ferret out improper
government motives.73 Nevertheless, the first rationale for the
68. Stone, supra note 28, at 101.
69. Id. at 101-02.
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. Stone, supra note 28, at 81 n.3. Ordinarily, any viewpoint-differential
impact, see infra note 76, of a content-neutral regulation will include a whole
range of viewpoints. Stone, supra note 28, at 110-11. This decreases the
probability that the government intended to restrict any of them. By contrast,
content-based regulations explicitly focus on specific views, and the inference
to an improper motive is correspondingly stronger. Id.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Even if government disapproval is a legitimate reason for prohibiting a
commercial message, at least one of the reasons for strictly scrutinizing regula-
tions which are probably based on such disapproval applies to commercial as
well as noncommercial speech. There are two reasons why the government is
prohibited from restricting non-commercial messages of which it disapproves.
First, the system of free expression serves personal growth, autonomy, and
self-realization by fostering individual social and political choice. Stone, supra
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two-tiered approach, prevention of distortion, does apply to
commercial speech, and consequently the two-tiered system of
review is arguably justified as applied to such expression.
Under the proposed analogy, deferential review of the com-
mercial component of the San Diego ordinance would be appro-
priate if the ordinance were content-neutral. Because the
ordinance is content-based,7 4 however, Metromedia's departure
from the intermediate standard of review in Central Hudson is
justified only if there is some reason to treat the commercial
component of the ordinance as if it were content-neutral. The
commercial component does not restrict any particular
message, but only the general subject matter of billboards.
Moreover, the off-site category used in the commercial compo-
nent of the San Diego ordinance is broadly defined.7 5 One com-
mentator has suggested that the Court has treated subject
matter regulations as if they were content-neutral when the
categories of subject matter were broadly defined.76 According
note 28, at 104. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Repressive gov-
ernment motive is inconsistent with those ideals. This rationale, however, pre-
sumably does not apply to commercial speech. Regulations of nonverbal
economic conduct have long inhibited individual commercial decisions without
violating the Constitution. Restrictions on noncommercial messages that are
based on government disapproval are also impermissable, however, because
such regulations distort the marketplace of ideas. Stone, supra note 28, at 103-
04. If this second rationale has any significance beyond the general concern for
such distortion, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, it must be that inten-
tional distortion is likely to be more drastic, because it is more focused than
unintentional distortion. Therefore, even if regulations of commercial
messages that are based on government disapproval are permissible, they
should be scrutinized more strictly than regulations in which such motives may
be absent.
74. See supra note 39.
75. Off-site signs are thosethat refer to a product not produced or sold, or
a company not located, where, the billboard is placed. See supra note 2. This
category does not distinguish among types of products and services, so its
message-differential impact, if any, will include ads for a wide variety of
products.
76. See generally Stone, supra note 28. Neither subject-matter nor con-
tent-neutral regulations explicitly restrict particular viewpoints. Nevertheless,
both types of regulations can restrict one viewpoint more than another. Id. at
109-10. For example, a subject-matter-based ban on street demonstrations ad-
dressing the propriety of the Vietnam war would have restricted expressions of
opposition to that war more than expressions of support, because the war's
critics relied more heavily on this mode of communication. Id. Similarly, a ban
on all handbills, although content-neutral, restricts the expression of view-
points by people in lower economic classes more than it restricts the views by
groups able to afford access to more expensive media. See, e.g., Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (door-to-door distribution of circulars essen-
tial to causes of poorer people). If the category of subject matter is a broad
one, such as public-interest issues, the viewpoint-differential impact will be
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to this theory, the plurality was justified in treating the com-
mercial component of the San Diego ordinance as if it were
content-neutral and reviewing it under a standard more lenient
than the Central Hudson test.77
On the strength of the analogy to noncommercial speech, it
thus appears that the Court will extend the deferential review
applied in Metromedia to other regulations of commercial
speech that are effectively content-neutral. Only those regula-
tions of commercial speech that are content-based will con-
tinue to receive the intermediate level of scrutiny applied in
Central Hudson. The Court's treatment of the commercial
component of the San Diego ordinance does not, therefore, rep-
resent a general weakening of the intermediate-level Central
Hudson test. It merely indicates that the lower value the court
assigns to commercial speech affects the review of content-neu-
tral as well as content-based regulations.
broad, as it is with content-neutral regulations. See Stone, supra note 28, at
112; supra note 71. IfA however, the subject-matter category is narrow, any im-
pact will be similar to that of a viewpoint-based regulation, and it is therefore
more likely that impermissible government disapproval of the restricted
messages motivated enactment of the law. Id. at Ill. Strict scrutiny is there-
fore employed in such cases. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 28, at 86-87; supra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
77. It could be argued that the deferential rational basis test is too lenient,
in that billboards are the least expensive, most practical means of advertising
for some businesses, Joint Stipulation of Facts, Nos. 24, 28, App. at 44a, 48a, Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), and hence the San
Diego ordinance will probably have the greatest impact on the messages of
smaller, less wealthy companies. When content-neutral regulations of noncom-
mercial speech have a viewpoint-differential impact, the government's burden
in justifying those regulations increases. See supra note 29. The burden of jus-
tification increases because the distortion of the "market place of ideas" is
greater. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. This reasoning also ap-
plies to the analogous distortion of the free flow of commercial information.
Consequently, a level of review between the rational basis test and the Central
Hudson standard is arguably appropriate for the commercial component of the
San Diego ordinance. The Supreme Court's decision in Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979), is an apparent precedent for such a "low-intermediate" level of
review. In Friedman, the ban on the use of trademarks by optometrists would
clearly affect the flow of information about commercial optometrists who used
trademarks more than it would affect advertisements by "professional" optome-
trists, whose code of ethics forbade such use. Banning such advertising would
at least temporarily reduce the flow of information about the services of the op-
tometrists, because constant usage had created an association between the
quality of service and the trademark. In reviewing this ban, the Court ex-
amined actual evidence of a connection between the regulation and the danger
of deceptive advertising it was to prevent. Id. at 13-14. Nevertheless, the regula-
tion's overinclusiveness did not invalidate it. Id.
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B. DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
1. The Definitional Problem Raised by Metromedia
Metromedia's bifurcated approach to billboard advertising
requires courts reviewing regulations of this medium to distin-
guish between commercial and noncommercial speech. Under
the Court's current commercial speech doctrine, however, the
distinction is not clear.78 The lack of definitional clarity is criti-
cal for two reasons. Noncommercial speech is valued more
highly than commercial expression and therefore receives
greater protection from governmental regulation.7 9 Given this
difference, if advertisers are uncertain about the status of a
particular message, they may decide to forego publication
rather than risk regulation. The definitional problem thus
threatens to chill some protected noncommercial speech.0 Al-
ternatively, the lack of a consistent definition of commercial
speech may encourage advertisers to modify their messages to
avoid regulation. 81 Because Metromedia requires courts to
scrutinize regulations of noncommercial advertising more
strictly than regulations of commercial advertising, a munici-
pality that enacts a general prohibition may be able to justify
only the commercial component of its ordinance. Thus, munici-
palities may choose to weaken or delete the noncommercial
component of their ordinances. Should this occur, advertisers
may circumvent regulatory attempts by appending a noncom-
78. The Court's use of different definitions of commercial speech, even
within one opinion, see infra note 84, blurs the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial expression. The most recent and most elaborate explana-
tion of these definitions makes the line between commercial advertisements
and political speech of sellers and manufacturers especially unclear. See infra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 32, 54, 65-77 and accompanying text.
80. The chilling effect doctrine is usually used to invalidate statutes, not to
evaluate definitions the Court has developed. Nevertheless, one commentator
suggested that the Court will avoid using a constitutional doctrine if its vague-
ness is likely to chill protected speech. L. TamE, supra note 17, § 12-26, at 714-
16.
81. The requirement that a definition of commercial speech preclude any
substantial opportunity for evasion is an example of the fundamental precept
that a constitutional category should serve the purposes for which it was in-
tended. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 579 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court distinguished commercial
speech from other protected expression to explain why the regulation of false
and misleading advertising is constitutional. See supra notes 22-24 and accom-
panying text. If a substantial amount of commercial advertising the Court
wants the government to be able to regulate escapes the Court's definition,




mercial component to an otherwise commercial message.8 2
2. The Supreme Court's Definitions
In view of the definitional problems posed by the bifur-
cated approach, an adequate definition of commercial speech
must satisfy three criteria: it must be sufficiently clear so that
ordinances imposing greater restrictions on commercial speech
will not significantly chill noncommercial expression; it must
prevent any substantial degree of evasion by commercial ad-
vertisers; and, it must permit an explanation of why commer-
cial speech is less valuable than noncommercial speech.83
Although the Supreme Court has formulated three alternative
definitions of commercial speech,84 none of these definitions,
nor any reasonable modification of them, satisfy all three
criteria.
The Court's first definition of commercial speech, "speech
that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' ",85
82. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 2909 (Brennan,
J., concurring). For example, if taken literally, the definition of commercial
speech as "speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction,"
see infra note 85 and accompanying text, is easily circumvented. Advertisers
need only append some brief political or public interest message to the promo-
tion of their product. Even with the added requirement that the promotional
part be relevant to the political portion, this definition presents a substantial
problem of evasion. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Neverthe-
less, the problem of evasion may be reduced in the case of billboards because
of the limited complexity of the messages they can convey. Interview with
Daniel A. Farber, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (Nov. 4,
1981). The bifurcated approach in Metromedia, however, is readily applicable
to review of regulations of other media, such as handbills, where the messages
are longer and the potential evasion problem is consequently more acute.
83. The last criterion ensures that the definition is consistent with the
Court's justification for permitting stricter regulation of commercial speech.
See supra notes 25-26, 32 and accompanying text. This requirement also pre-
vents any narrowing of the scope of protection for noncommercial speech and
the resulting dilution of first amendment principles, and therefore helps ensure
that any definition of commercial speech will further the purpose of the com-
mercial speech doctrine. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
84. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court implied that commercial speech in-
cludes only advertisements that do "no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), employed two defini-
tions: "'speech proposing a commercial transaction,"' id. at 562 (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)), and "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," id. at
561. For a discussion of the distinction between the first definition proposed in
Central Hudson and the definition used in Virginia Pharmacy, see infra note
90. Lower courts have noted the lack of a consistent definition of commercial
speech. E.g., Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 563 (8th Cir. 1981).
85. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
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fails to prevent evasion by commercial advertisers. 86 This defi-
nition appears to include only advertisements that contain
product and price information, and possibly persuasive content,
without reference to any subject of broader public concern.87
Regulations based on this definition can be evaded because
commercial advertisers can obtain the full protection of the
first amendment merely by including messages of general pub-
lic interest in their advertisements. Although the Court might
avoid this problem by requiring that the price and product in-
formation in advertisements be relevant to their public interest
component to qualify for full protection,88 this approach does
not completely preclude the evasion of restrictions on commer-
cial advertising. Because of the highly politicized nature of cur-
rent economic problems, price and product information will
frequently be relevant to political and economic questions.89
Comparison of prices and features on Japanese and American
cars, for example, is clearly relevant to an American car manu-
facturer's advertisements encouraging consumers to fight un-
employment by "buying American." Although the price and
product information in this advertisement poses the same dan-
gers of deception to consumers as does "speech that does no
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
86. It could be argued that this definition also fails the third criterion. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text. The value the Court has identified in
commercial speech is factual information concerning products and prices. See
supra note 19 and accompanying text. Because a responsible evaluation of
ideas depends on facts, factual information is implicated in the search for polit-
ical truth which the constitutional protection of ideological speech is designed
to foster. In fact, the Court has identified the political importance of commer-
cial information as one of its values. See id. Nevertheless, the Court probably
distinguishes the political value of commercial advertising from that of ideolog-
ical speech, because the former contributes less directly to the expression of
political opinions. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
87. The Court devised this definition when it determined that even this
type of speech should be protected by the first amendment. Originally, the
purpose of this definition was to isolate speech lacking any explicit political
content. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. at 764-65. The Court, however, used this definition to distin-
guish commercial speech from other expression that enjoys greater first
amendment protection. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
88. The Court has implied that a similar approach could be used to deal
with the problem of pornographers who attempt to "upgrade" their otherwise
unprotected product with quotes from the classics. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229, 230-31 (1972) (per curiam).
89. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 n.5 (1980).
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more than propose a commercial transaction," the message
falls outside this definition of commercial speech.
By broadening the definition of commercial speech to in-
clude "speech which proposes a commercial transaction,"9 0 the
Central Hudson Court avoided evasion by advertisers. This
definition fails, however, to explain why commercial speech is
less valuable than noncommercial speech, and threatens to
chill some noncommercial expression.
The Court has explicitly included within this definition
statements about issues of public concern that appear in com-
mercial advertisements.9 ' For example, this definition of com-
mercial speech includes an advertisement by a utility
promoting electricity consumption by emphasizing its environ-
mental benefits, or an advertisement by an American car man-
ufacturer encouraging consumers to buy American-made cars
because such purchases will reduce unemployment.9 2 Because
this definition includes advertisements with clear political sig-
nificance, it fails to explain why commercial speech is less valu-
able than noncommercial speech.
The Court attempted to minimize the significance of this
problem by noting that commercial entities "enjoy the full pan-
oply of First Amendment protections for their direct comments
on public issues." 93 The Court thus implicitly suggested that
commercial advertisements including political content can be
regulated as strictly as other commercial speech, because the
advertiser is free to excise the political message from its com-
mercial context and express it directly. Political and commer-
cial speech, however, cannot always be separated. Central
Hudson held that commercial speech includes all advertise-
ments that are clearly intended to promote sales. 94 Since any
message that mentions the political advantages of a product
may reflect an intent to promote sales, sellers may be denied
90. Id. at 562. This definition is broader because commercial speech is no
longer limited to speech which "does no more than" propose a sale. The more
circumscribed definition used in Virginia Pharmacy was devised specifically to
exclude advertisements that also contained broader socio-political content. See
supra note 87. In Central Hudson, the Court explicitly included broader con-
tent in its definition, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5, and thus eliminated the possibility of
evasion.




94. See id. at 559, 561.
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their full first amendment rights to express the politically sig-
nificant advantages of their products.
Under this definition of commercial speech, statutes that
restrict only commercial expression may also create a chilling
effect on the political speech of commercial entities. Although
the Court has asserted that political speech of such entities is
fully protected, Central Hudson appears to mandate that courts
classify such expression as commercial speech if the advertise-
ment relates to the political advantages of the seller's product.
The resulting uncertainty in the scope of full first amendment
protection may chill the expression of these political ideas, be-
cause the speaker can not express them in a way that avoids
the risk of regulation.
The third definition of commercial speech---"expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its au-
dience" 9 5 -fails to satisfy at least two of the three criteria of
adequacy. First, evasion by advertisers is not precluded.
Under this definition, a court would not classify an American
car manufacturer's comparison of its products to Japanese cars
as commercial speech if that comparison were used to support
an argument that consumers should "buy American" to bolster
the economy. Even if the manufacturer were motivated solely
by profit, its speech would relate to the broader political con-
cerns of its audience. In addition, this definition suggests that a
paid speech by an economist to a group of investors, economic
advice columns in newspapers, and perhaps even stock market
reports are all commercial speech; consequently it fails to ex-
plain why commercial speech is less valuable, because these
forms of expression are as valuable as fully protected speech.96
3. The Definitional Dilemma
No definition of commercial speech can meet all three crite-
ria of adequacy because commercial advertising and political
speech substantially overlap.97 Consequently, any definition
that excludes all political content will also exclude some
messages containing price and product information, thus creat-
ing an incentive for evasion. A definition that includes all ad-
vertisements containing price and product information will,
95. Id. at 561.
96. See id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. When price and product information are relevant to political issues,
they become politically significant, and when a manufacturer touts the political
advantages of its product, the political message assumes commercial overtones.
See supra notes 89, 96 and accompanying text.
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however, also encompass a number of political messages.
There is no satisfactory solution to this dilemma, because a
vague definition of commercial speech that avoids both
problems will create a chilling effect on the political expression
of commercial entities.
This definitional dilemma can only be resolved by aban-
doning one of the three criteria of adequacy.98 The first and
second criteria are vital, because they ensure that a definition
will serve the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine-to
permit legislative control of deceptive advertising without
weakening first amendment protection for other forms of ex-
pression. 99 The third criterion, however, merely reflects the
particular explanation that the Court has adopted to justify
such legislative control.1 00 The Court could therefore solve the
definitional problem by abandoning the theory that commercial
speech is less valuable than political speech and that this dif-
ference justifies the stricter regulation of commercial speech.
This solution requires the Court to adopt another justification
for the control of deceptive advertising. To be viable, the new
formulation of the commercial speech doctrine should allow
regulation of commercial advertising to prevent consumer de-
ception, but should also fully protect any political content in
such speech.
The test for the validity of content-neutral regulations es-
tablished in United States v. O'Brien'0 suggests a means for
achieving these goals. According to O'Brien:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it... furthers an im-
portant or substantial government interest, if the governmental inter-
est is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest 10 2
Pursuant to O'Brien, the Court should identify an aspect of
speech peculiar to commercial advertising that creates a gov-
ernmental interest, unrelated to suppression of expression, in
regulating false and misleading speech. If this uniquely com-
mercial aspect of speech is isolated, the O'Brien test will ex-
plain why regulatory devices that are usually invalid as applied
to noncommercial expression are permissible when used to
control deceptive advertising.103 This approach also accommo-
98. See supra text accompanying note 83.
99. See supra notes 22-24, 81 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
101. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
102. Id. at 377.
103. The OBrien test is considerably weaker than the compelling state in-
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dates the overlap between political and commercial speech.
Because the O'Brien test applies to regulations of fully pro-
tected expression, even commercial advertising containing a
political component can be justifiably regulated to prevent con-
sumer deception without weakening first amendment protec-
tion for political speech. 04 No definitional problems arise
because controls on deceptive advertising are justified by the
distinction between commercial and informational functions of
expression, instead of the specious distinction between com-
mercial and political speech.105 With this approach commercial
speech can then be defined as any speech that exhibits this
commercial aspect, even speech that contains a political
component.
IV. PROPOSAL: REGULATION OF THE CONTRACTUAL
FUNCTION OF ADVERTISING
Professor Daniel Farber has proposed that the commercial
aspect justifying the regulation of false and misleading adver-
tising is the contractual function of commercial speech.106
Under this analysis commercial advertising serves a contrac-
tual function because it constitutes a seller's potential commit-
ment to a buyer.107 This contractual function is distinct from
advertising's informational function. According to Farber, "A
terest test normally applied to a content-based regulation such as a prohibition
on misleading speech. To satisfy the O'Brien test the government interest need
only be substantial, not compelling. Also, because the government interest in
O'Brien must be unrelated to suppression of expression, O'Brien is a version of
the test applied to content-neutral regulations. See supra note 29. The third
criterion in O'Brien has therefore been applied as a balancing test. See Ely,
supra note 28, at 1484-90.
104. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
105. A consequence of this approach is that regulations which are not justi-
fied by reference to some uniquely commercial aspect are subject to the same
level of review whether applied to commercial or noncommercial speech. The
justifications for the San Diego billboard ban, aesthetics and traffic safety, ap-
ply equally to commercial and noncommercial billboard messages. Because
they have nothing to do with the message a billboard carries, these justifica-
tions do not depend on any commercial quality of the speech regulated. Under
the proposed approach, the ordinance in Metromedia would therefore be re-
viewed according to a unitary standard.
106. Farber, supra note 22.
107. Id. at 387. Statements about a product made in an advertisement ap-
pear to function as express warranties when the advertisement results in a
sale. Id. at 390. The Uniform Commercial Code states:
(a) Any affirmation of fact ... made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain cre-
ates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion ....
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
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justification for regulating the seller's speech relates to the con-
tractual function of speech, if and only if, the state's interest
disappears when the same statements are made by a third per-
son with no relation to the transaction."108 The distinction be-
tween regulations of the contractual and the informational
functions of expression is significant. Contractual language,
unlike speech which conveys information, is a type of expres-
sion to which first amendment protections have not tradition-
ally applied.109 Under Farber's proposal, regulations of the
contractual function of advertising therefore serve government
interests unrelated to free expression.11o Consequently, the va-
lidity of such regulations should be scrutinized under the
O'Brien test."' Courts should review all other regulations of
commercial speech, Farber maintains, under the appropriate
standard for regulations of noncommercial speech."l2
Farber's proposal identifies a commercial aspect of speech
which explains why prohibitions on false and misleading adver-
tising are compatible with the first amendment. These laws are
designed to serve the state's interest in ensuring that sellers
perform their commitments to buyers;"13 if misleading state-
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (a), (b) (1978). See also J. WHrrE & 1. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE Unoim COMMERCIAL CODE 335-36 (2d ed. 1980) and cases
cited therein.
108. Farber, supra note 22, at 388-89.
109. Farber observes that
[c]ontract law consists almost entirely of rules attaching liability to
various uses of language.... [A] seller is obviously liable for dam-
ages for failure to deliver a product corresponding to the contract
description. No first amendment problem exists. Yet contract liability
is imposed under rules which would not be tolerated even in areas
which traditionally have been subject to state regulation, such as libel.
For instance, statements in the contract are frequently construed
against the draftsman. In addition, liability may be imposed even
though experts disagree about whether the product fits the description.
The seller is usually held liable, without any showing of malice, scien-
ter, or even negligence. Despite all this, the state's power to impose li-
ability is beyond any dispute. Not even the strongest partisan of
content neutrality would argue that contractual liability cannot be val-
idly imposed on the basis of the content of the language used in the
contract. The reason appears to be that the use of language to form
contracts is not the sort of "speech" to which the first amendment
applies.
Id. at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 387.
111. Id. at 388. For a discussion of the O'Brien test, see supra notes 102-105
and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 388.
113. Id. at 390. The law of express warranties distinguishes between "affir-
mations," which constitute express warranties, and "puffs" or opinions, which
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ments about a product are made by a third party consumer or-
ganization, for example, the state's regulatory interest
disappears. Under the proposed test, these regulations there-
fore relate solely to the contractual function of advertising.
Consequently, the state's interest is unrelated to suppression
of expression, and the second prong of the O'Brien test is satis-
fied. Truth-in-advertising laws also meet O'Brien's other re-
quirements. The government interest in protecting consumers
and ensuring fulfillment of express warranties is substantial,"14
and the other method of enforcement-damages-is a less ef-
fective means to that end.115
The contractual function theory also avoids the definitional
problems inherent in the current commercial speech doctrine.
There is no incentive for evasion by advertisers under the con-
tractual function theory. Stricter regulation of commercial
speech is justified whenever the government interest relates to
the contractual function of advertising. Commercial advertisers
cannot avoid regulations of deceptive advertising by modifying
their messages, because the state's interest in regulating the
do not. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1978). Although this distinction is not clear, J. WHrrE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 107, at 329-31, it appears to depend in part on the rea-
sonableness of the buyer's reliance on the seller's statements. Id. It might
seem to follow that highly exaggerated advertising claims do not function as
express warranties because reliance on them is unreasonable. If such claims
are merely puff, they do not serve a contractual function, and consequently, ac-
cording to the contractual function theory, the first amendment does not permit
their regulation to prevent deception of consumers. This result would be unde-
sirable because controls on deceptive advertising are designed to protect
against highly exaggerated advertising claims. There are two reasons, however,
why the range of the contractual function theory closely matches the intended
scope of regulations of deceptive advertising. First, factors in addition to, or
perhaps contributing to, the reasonableness of a buyer's reliance skew the dis-
tinction between an affirmation and a puff in favor of the buyer. These factors
include the relative knowledge of buyer and seller, J. WrrE & I. SUMMERS,
supra note 107, at 330, and the opportunity the buyer has to verify the seller's
claim. Id Thus, reliance on apparently farfetched claims may be reasonable if
'the claims go beyond the buyer's knowledge or the buyer's opportunity to ac-
quire it. Second, truth-in-advertising laws have been construed to prohibit ad-
vertisements having a tendency to deceive the general public. See Doherty,
Clifford, Steers, & Shenfirled v. F.T.C., 392 F.2d 921, 928-29 (6th Cir. 1968) (con-
struing 15 U.S.C. § 52). These laws were apparently not intended to protect the
unusually gullible consumer. Yet, if an advertisement deceives most people, it
follows that reliance on it, although misplaced, is not unreasonable. Therefore,
the criterion of reasonableness incorporated in the contractual function theory
through the Uniform Commercial Code closely matches the range of advertise-
ments that existing controls on advertisements are designed to cover.
114. See Farber, supra note 22, at 390.
115. Farber argues that a damage action for breach of warranty is not a sub-
stitute for regulation of advertising, because the damage remedy is primarily
remedial rather than preventative. Farber, supra note 22, at 391.
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contractual function will remain even if the advertisements
contain political content. In addition, there is little danger that
regulation of advertising will inhibit political expression by
commercial advertisers, either by direct prohibition or by a
chilling effect. For example, a car manufacturer's advertise-
ment urging consumers to support the country's economy by
purchasing American-made cars clearly expresses a political
opinion, and the contractual function theory accords this state-
ment full first amendment protection. The contractual function
of advertising stems from the potential incorporation of a
seller's advertising claims into an express warranty of its prod-
ucts.11 6 Only those statements, however, that represent an af-
firmation about the product, as opposed to a mere opinion or
"puff," become a part of this warranty."17 The manufacturer's
political opinions about its products do not, therefore, serve a
contractual function and consequently cannot be prohibited by
regulations of false and deceptive advertising. In addition,
there is little danger that these opinions will be chilled by such
regulations. Although the distinction between an affirmation
and an opinion or puff is not clear,118 most expressions of polit-
ical opinions about a product are easily recognized as such by
both advertisers and their audience.1 9 In the example of the
hypothetical car manufacturer, no buyer could reasonably con-
clude that the advertisement constitutes a promise that
purchasing this type of car will have a beneficial effect on the
economy. The contractual function theory therefore does not
create the uncertainty necessary to generate a chilling effect.
Abandoning the current commercial speech doctrine in
favor of the contractual function theory also maintains consis-
tency with prior precedent. The scale of first amendment val-
ues approach and the contractual function theory differ
primarily in their treatment of regulations that do not relate to
the contractual function of the message. 20 With the exception
116. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117. See U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1978); supra note 113.
118. See 3. WmTE & R. SUMMEPs, supra note 107, at 330-31.
119. Id.
120. The contractual function theory provides that such regulations should
be reviewed according to ordinary first amendment standards. See supra note
112 and accompanying text. By contrast, the scale of first amendment values
approach requires that all regulations of commercial speech be reviewed more
leniently than analogous regulations of noncommercial speech. See supra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text Under the proposed analysis, if the govern-
ment's regulatory interest relates to the contractual function of advertising, the
intermediate level O'Brien test is used. That standard is similar to the Central
Hudson test for content-based regulations of commercial speech. Content-
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of Central Hudson and Metromedia, the Court has decided all
of the cases reviewing a regulation of this type pursuant to
traditional first amendment principles.121 Because these stan-
dards would also apply under the contractual function the-
ory,122 the result will be the same under either approach. In
Central Hudson, the state's regulatory interest was similarly
unrelated to the contractual function of the prohibited adver-
tisements. The state's interest in energy conservation would
exist whether the utility or a third party ran advertisements
promoting the use of electricity. Under the contractual func-
tion theory, the ban on promotional advertisements should
therefore be reviewed according to ordinary first amendment
principles for content-based regulations. Consistent with the
Court's disposition of that case, although contrary to its reason-
ing,'23 the law would be invalidated under the compelling state
interest test. 24
The contractual function theory, however, would require
the Court to modify its decision in Metromedia. San Diego's
prohibition of most billboard advertisements did not relate to
the contractual function of the regulated speech, because the
ordinance's stated purposes of promoting aesthetics and traffic
safety would be frustrated even if third parties purchased bill-
board space to advertise a seller's products. Under the contrac-
tual function theory, the commercial component of the
ordinance should be reviewed according to the ordinary balanc-
ing test for content-neutral regulations.125 Since the San Diego
based regulations related to the contractual function of advertising would
therefore be reviewed according to the same standard under both theories. See
supra notes 35, 102 and accompanying text. According to current commercial
speech doctrine, however, a content-neutral regulation should be reviewed
deferentially. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. If such a law re-
lates to advertising's contractual function, the O'rien test would still apply
under the contractual function theory. Because the Court has never confronted
such a regulation, this difference between the two approaches is not yet re-
flected in the Court's commercial speech cases.
121. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court reviewed a regulation whose purpose was
the maintenance of high professional standards among pharmacists. The regu-
lation addressed in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977), sought to prevent "white flight" from a neighborhood by banning "for
sale" signs. For a discussion of the standard of review employed in those cases,
see supra notes 28, 37 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123. The regulation was struck down because it was not necessary to
achieve the goal of energy conservation. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 568 (1980).
124. See supra note 37.
125. Although the commercial component is, technically speaking, content
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ordinance fails to preserve adequate alternative channels of
communication 26 and has a de facto viewpoint-differential im-
pact, 2 7 the applicable standard of review requires a substantial
justification for the ordinance.12 8 The record in Metromedia,
however, does not demonstrate that the ordinance improved
aesthetics or traffic safety,129 and the ban should therefore be
invalidated under the contractual function theory.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court divided San Diego's prohibition
against billboards into a commercial and a noncommercial com-
ponent, and reviewed the commercial aspect of the ordinance
deferentially while subjecting its noncommercial aspect to
heightened scrutiny. This bifurcated approach resulted from a
departure from the test applied to commercial speech regula-
tions in Central Hudson. Although this departure can be rec-
onciled with Central Hudson, Metromedia's bifurcated
approach makes an adequate definition of commercial speech
impossible. Any definition will allow either some commercial
advertisements to escape reasonable consumer protection reg-
ulation or will unduly inhibit fully protected political
expression.
Because Metromedia leads to a definitional impasse, this
Comment has suggested that the Court revise its justification
for permitting commercial speech to be regulated more strictly
than noncommercial speech. Under the suggested approach,
the Court should justify strict controls on advertising by refer-
ence to the contractual function of such expression. All other
restrictions on commercial speech should be reviewed accord-
ing to the standards applicable to regulations of noncommercial
speech. This proposal has several advantages. By appealing to
the distinction between the contractual and informational func-
tions of expression, the Court would avoid reliance on an un-
tenable distinction between commercial and political speech.
In addition, the contractual function theory is consistent with
all of the Court's commercial speech decisions except Me-
tromedia itself, and unlike the present commercial speech doc-
based, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, the categories of subject mat-
ter it regulates are so broadly defined that under prior precedent it would be
treated as content-neutraL See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 77.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 29.
129. 101 S. Ct. at 2903-04.
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trine, it justifies regulation of false or misleading advertising
without weakening first amendment protection for other ex-
pression. The Court should therefore abandon the current
commercial speech doctrine and adopt the contractual function
theory.
